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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIAMOND T UTAH, INC., et al., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant and Thi,rd Party 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
[TNDERWRITERS A T LLOYD8. 
LONDON, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Bl~IEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
9284 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This appeal involves two separate trials, one pri-
lnaril~? bet,Yeen Diamond T Utah, Inc., et al., plaintiffs 
nnd respondents, and Canal Insurance Company (here-
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inafter referred to as Canal) and the other primarily 
between 1Canal Insurance Company and Under,vriters 
at Lloyds, London (hereinafter referred to as Lloyds). 
When Dia1nond T Utah, Inc., et al, sued ·Canal under 
a physical damage insurance policy issued by Canal to 
Diamond T Utah, Inc., et al., Canal filed a Third Party 
Complaint against Lloyds claiming that if Canal "\Yere 
liable, Lloyds would be liable for 75 per cent of the 
liability of Canal by virtue of a reinsurance certificate 
issued by Lloyds to Canal. 
Trial was held first in the case of Diamond T Utah, 
Inc., et al., against Canal and resulted in a judgment 
against ·Canal. Follov.ring this, trial "\Yas had in the case 
of Canal against Lloyds and resulted in a judgment 
in favor of Canal and against Lloyds. This appeal "\Yas 
taken by Lloyds fron1 both judgments. 
Since the record pagination does not include the 
supplemental transcript, references herein to the record 
are designated "R. ~' and to the supplen1ental transcript, 
"T ." 
STATEJ\IIENT OF FACTS 
On !\larch 3, 1959, Dirunond T Utah, Inc., a lTtah 
corporation, and Shern1an N. Drain and John ..._\. Drain, 
doing business as D & ''T Transport brought an action 
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in the Dstrict Court of Salt Lake County against Canal 
clain1ing that on or about April 7, 1958, Canal issued 
an insurance policy insuring a motor vehicle for one 
year fro1n that date and that by this policy ·Canal agreed 
to pay the cost of any damage to said motor vehicle 
less $250. Plaintiffs claimed that on June 30, 1958, the 
vehicle was demolished in a road collision resulting in 
damage of $13,000. 
Canal later filed a motion for permission to file a 
Third Party Complaint against Lloyds. This motion was 
granted on April 28, 1959. 
On ~fay 4, 1959, Canal served its Ans\ver and Third 
Party Complaint upon Dian1ond T Utah, Inc., et al., 
alleging that the Co1nplaint failed to state a claim upon 
w·hich relief could be granted, that there was a defect 
in parties plaintiff in that Utah Savings and Trust 
Co1npany \Yas not nan1ed a party and that the policy 
was cancelled effective l\{ay 2±, 1958. The Third Party 
Complaint alleged that on April 7, 1958, Lloyds issued 
to ·Canal a reinsurance certificate, No. AM 0165-93, by 
the terms of \Vhich Lloyds agreed to reinsure 75 p·er 
cent of the risk assumed by Canal under its policy in 
favor of Diamond T Utah and the Drains, and sought 
recovery against Lloyds of 75 per cent of any amounts 
found to be due Diamond T or the Drains from Canal. 
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On June 15, 1959, Lloyds served its Answer to 
the Third Party Complaint alleging that the Complaint 
failed to state a claim contemplated by Rule 14-, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and that any reinsurance cer-
tificate issued by Lloyds to Canal was cancelled prior 
to the alleged loss. 
On July 29, 1959, Dian1ond T lJtah, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, Sherman N. Drain and John A. Drain, 
doing business as D & W Transport and Zion's First 
National Bank, formerly Utah Savings and Trust ·Com-
pany, a lTtah corporation, served their An1ended ·Com-
plaint upon Canal Insurance Company w·hereby said 
Zion's First National Bank 'vas made an additional party 
plaintiff. 
On August 11, 1959, Canal Insurance Con1pany filed 
an Answer to the Amended Complaint relying essen-
tially upon the sa1ne defenses set forth in its Ans"~er 
to the original Co1nplaint. 
On October 29, 1959, a pretrial hearing ,\~as held 
during 'vhich it 'yas agreed that the claiin bet"~een 
Dia1nond T and others and ·Canal ,yould be tried before 
the rlailn bet\\~ren ·Canal and Lloyds. It 'vas stipulated 
that the policy· refPrred to in the pleadings had been 
iRHnPrl and rould be received in eYidence at the tin10 of 
trial. The iH~nes "~rre agreed to be: 
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1. Whether or not the insurance policy in 
question \vas in force and effect on the date of 
the loss, to wit: June 30, 1958. 
2. The amount of damage suffered by the 
plain tiffs. 
The position of Canal was stated as foll·o\vs: 
"The position of the Defendant is that the 
policy had been cancelled at a time prior to the 
loss by the mailing of notices of cancellation in 
accordance 'vith the provisions of the policy." 
(R. 41) 
No clain1 of reinstatement or estoppel was made 
and no discussion of those subjects had at the pretrial 
(R. 40-42). 
Trial of the claim between Diamond T Utah, Inc., 
et al., and Canal 'vas held February 25, 1960, before 
the IIonorable Joseph G. Jeppson, District Judge, and 
the following evidence produced. 
On :J[arch 29, 1957, Sher1nan N. Drain and John 
A. Drain, doing business as D & W Transport, entered 
into a Conditional Sale Contract with Diamond T Utah, 
Inc., for the purchase of a 1955 \\"'"hite Freightliner 
tractor (Ex. 7). This contract 'vas then sold to Utah 
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Savings & Trust, \vlrich subsequently became Zion's First 
National Bank, with the provision that Diamond T 'vas 
to repurchase the contract in the event the payments 
fro1n D & \'/ Transport became more than sixty days 
past due (T. 93). The contract 'vas repurchased from 
Zion's First National Bank by Diamond T about July 
25, 1958 (T. 93). 
On April 7, 1958, Mr. Roy G. James, an agent of 
Farmers Insurance Group (T. 83) acting for D & \V. 
Transport, placed an automobile insurance policy, No. 
A-77765, covering physical damage to the White tractor, 
through the Benson Company with Canal. (Ex. 1, T. 
11, 12). A down payment on this policy 'vas 1uade by 
James in the amo1mt of $161.70 on that date and the 
remainder of the pre1uium was to be paid by the insured, 
Sherman N. Drain and John A. Drain, in n1onthly p(1y-
ments (T. 106). 
On April 18, 1958, at the request of J a1nes, ·Canal, 
through Surplus Line ·Con1pany, "~rote an automobile 
lia.bili t~~ policy (Ex. 6), insuring the Drains against 
public liabilit~~ arising out of the operation of the 
\Vhite tractor. I-Iowever, since no do,vn pay1uent ,yas 
1nade and no payn1ent reePived Surplus Line retained 
the policy in its office (T. 13). Son1e tinu• after .A.pril 
18, 1958 and prior to l\[a~~ 14, 1958, Canal directed 
Rurplus Line to secure full liability· coYerar-:e on the 
])rain account or h.•r1ninate t1H• risk (T. 15). Ja1nes 
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report Pd that there was no possibility of getting full 
liability covl)rage since the Drains had a portion of 
their coverage furnished by the parties with whom they 
contracted ( T. 34). 
The monthly premium on the physical damage policy 
due l\[ay 7, 1958 was not paid. On May 14, 1958, a 
notice of cancellation was prepared by Surplus Line 
(Ex. 2) and on that date, after being properly stamp·ed, 
copies of such notice were mailed to James, to the 
insured, Sherman N. Drain, to the loss-payee, Utah 
Savings & Trust, and to Canal (T. 60). Although the 
policy provided that ten days notice would· ·be given 
on cancellation by the company (Ex. 1), the cancella-
tion notiee provided that cancellation would be effective 
at the expiraton of five days. 
Sherman Drain, testifying on behalf of D & W 
Transport, and Grant Bryan, testifying on behalf of 
Zion's First National Bank, successor to Utah Savings 
& Loan, denied receipt of the notice of cancellation. This 
notice ''Tas the only notice ever prepared or sent by 
~urplus Line to Drain, James and Utah Savings & 
Loan or any of them ( T. 30, 31, 61, 63). 
Canal ackno\\Tledged recepit of the notice of cancel-
lation on June 19~ 1958 (Ex. +). J a1nes tPlephoned Sur-
plus Line Company and stated that Drain had received 
notice of c-ancellation (T. 21) and, in a statement taken 
.August 11, 1938, said: 
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"Sherman Drain brought this cancellation in 
to me on l\fay 28th. I don't know what day it was 
received. It was my understanding this cancella-
tion was to become effective on May 24th." (T. 
112). 
On July 1, 1958, James wrote to Mr. Stephen N etolicky, 
Manager of Surplus Line, acknowledging that he had 
received written cancellation of the D & W Transport 
policy (Ex. 3). 
-. On June 4, 1958, H. F. Benson, Jr., of Surplus 
Line advised Canal that Policy No. A-77765 had been 
cancelled, effective May 24, 1958. On June 6, 1958, Net-
olicky received from James a check in the amount of 
$181.04 (Ex. 11) on the D & \\T Transport account (Ex. 
5 ). 
Prior to receipt of this check, N etolicky told J an1es that 
even if James were to send the money in, the policy 
could not be reinstated because Canal 'Yould not stay on 
the risk (T. 34). 
Thereafter, on June 30, 1958, the 1955 '\~bite tractor, 
described in ·Canal Insurance Poliry K o. A-77765, "~as 
involved in an accident resulting in dan1ages in the 
agrePd UlllOUllt of $10,:250 (':r. 3). 
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After the trial on April 14, 1960, Judge J eppeson 
1nade and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Jja\\T, finding: 
""1±. That the aforesaid insurance policy was 
in full foree and effect at the time of the accident, 
and had not been cancelled prior thereto;" (R.76) 
From these facts, the Court concluded that Canal 
owed Diamond T $10,000 plus interest and costs, and 
on April 20, 1960, the Court made and entered its judg-
ment against Canal in that amount (R. 73, 76). 
On April 19, 1960, a pretrial hearing was held in 
connection \\ith the claim of Canal against Lloyds and 
the ease ~Pt for trial on !iay 16, 1960. It was agreed 
that Canal and Lloyds would present the case upon 
a \YTitten Stipulation of Facts. 
On April 23, 1960, ·Canal served a Motion for New 
Trial pursuant to the provisions of Rule 59, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, contending that the evidence was 
insufficient to justfy the verdict, t~1at the judgment was 
against law and that error in law occurred at the trial. 
Thi~ 1notion "\vas filed .A.pril ~3, 1960 (R. 80). 
On .. :\ pril 23, 1960, Lloyds served and filed its ~lotion 
for Xe\\'" Trial upon the same grounds (R. 81, 82). At 
the hearing upon the l\[otion for X e\v Trial, the Court 
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made a more detailed statement of the findings and 
having so· amended its Findings denied the Motions for 
New Trial on May 10, 1960. The amendment to the 
Findings was : 
"14.-A. That the testimony of the witness, 
Mrs. Sandra Redding, that she mailed the No-
tices of Cancellation to the named insured, and 
the loss payee named on the ·Canal Insurance 
Policy is true, and that said witness did, in fact, 
mail said notices, as testified by her." (R. 86, 87). 
The Court, however found that the primary reason 
for cancellation of the policy by Canal \Vas nonpayment 
of premiums and that premiums were received after 
cancellation of the policy and retained by Canal's agent 
and deposited to the account of Canal. Further, the 
Court found that Canal never returned the premiums 
and that the plaintiffs "~ere ju~ified in belieYing- that 
the insurance \vas in force and 
''That the Defendant is estopped fron1 clain1-
ing that the notices "Tere mailed, and from claim-
ing that the insurance policy \\~as cancelled.'' (R. 
87). 
Diamond T Utah, Inc., et nl., \Yas then granted 
p0r1nission to an1end the Pretrial OrdPr and file a 
Reply to alleg·r P~toppel to conforn1 to the proof ad1nitted 
in the ea~P (R. S7). 
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On nfay 31, 1960, Diamond T Utah, Inc., et al., served 
a Reply to the Answer of Canal and alleged: 
"That Defendant and Third Party Defendant 
are estopped from claiming that notices of can-
cellation were mailed to the Plaintiffs herein, 
and are estopped from alleging that the policy 
of insurance, referred to in paragraph 2 of Plain-
tiff's ·Con1plaint was cancelled and was not in 
force and effect on the 30th day of June, 1958, 
for the reason and on the grounds that said De-
fendant, Canal Insurance Company, through its 
agent, Surplus Line Company, accepted premi-
ums on said p·olicy subsequent to the claime·d can-
cellation, and that said premiums were retained 
by it and were never returned or offered to be 
returned to Plaintiffs." (R. 97). 
This reply "\vas filed on June 1, 1960. 
On l\1ay 23, 1960, trial of the issues between Canal 
and Lloyds "\vas had before the Honorable Aldon J . 
. A.nderson, District Judge, upon the following Stipula-
tion of Facts : 
'' 1. That Third Party Plaintiff, Canal In-
surance Company, is now, and was at all times 
herein mentioned, a corporation organized and 
existing under and by virtue of the la,vs of the 
State of South Carolina, and is now, and was at 
all ti1nes herein mentioned, regularly qualified 
to engage in and actually engaged, in the insur-
ance business in the State of Utah. 
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2. That Third Party Defendants are now, 
and were at all times herein mentioned, engaged 
in 'vriting various lines of insurance risks in the 
United States of America, and elsewhere, includ-
ing reinsurance, on policies of insurance issued 
by various American companies. 
3. ·That at all times herein n1entioned, The 
Benson ~company was the representative of Third 
Party Defendants in Salt Lake City, authorized 
to solicit and issue policies of insurance of vari-
ous types, and for and on behalf of Third Party 
Defendants. 
4. That on and prior to the 8th day of April, 
1958, The Benson Company was the agent of 
Third Party Plaintiff, Canal Insurance Company, 
with authority to solicit and to issue policies of 
Insurance 'vritten in the Canal Insurance Com-
pany. 
4A. That from and after April 9, 1958, H. 
F. Benson Jr., doing business as Surplus Lines 
Co1npany '';-as the agent of Third Party Plaintiff, 
Canal Insurance Con1pany, "\Yith authority to 
solicit and to issue policies of insurance "\vritten 
in the Canal Insurance Company. 
5. That during the tin1e that it/he "\Yas agent 
for Canal Insurance (~on1pany, H. F. Benson, Jr., 
had an oral understanding or agree1nent 'vith 
Canal Insurance ·Con1pany~ that he "\Yould rein-
sure all policies of physical drunage insurance 
'vith 1Tnder'\vriters of Lloyds, London~ to the ex-
tent of not less than 75 per cent of the entire 
a1nount of tl1P risk. 
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Third Party Defendant denies that this fact 
is in any ,,~ay binding upon it or admissable as 
evidence against it in this case. 
6. That there "\Yas no agreement bet\veen 
Third Party Defendant and any other person or 
party that Third Party Defendant, through its 
reprPsentatives, vv~ould not cancel any policy of 
reinsurance issued 1,~T such representatives. 
7. That on or about the 7th day of April, 
1958, 'Third Party Plaintiff issued to the Plain-
tiffs herein, Shennan N. Drain and John A. 
Drain, dba D & W Transport, a policy of insur-
ance designated as No. A-77765. That the afore-
said policy of insurance afforded coverage for 
collision or up-set of a certain 1955 'Vhite Truck 
therein design a ted. 
8. That on or about the 7th day of April, 
1938, Third Party Defendants issued to Third 
Party Plaintiff, their certificate of reinsurance 
No. AM 0165-93, a copy of which is hereunto 
annexed, and by this reference made a part here-
of. That by the terms of said certificate of re-
insurance, Third Party Defendants agreed to re-
insure to the extent of 75 per cent the risks in-
sured by Third Party Plaintiff under its policy 
of insurance No. A-77765. 
9. That on or about the 2nd day of :Jiay, 
1958, Third Party Plaintiff requested and directed 
H. F. Benson, Jr. to cancel the aforesaid Policy 
No. A-77765. 
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10. That on or about the 4th day of June, 
1958 H. F. Benson Jr., advised Third Party 
Plaintiff by letter that Policy No. A-77765 had 
been cancelled, effective l\Iay 24, 1958. 
11. That on June 19, 1958, Third Party Plain-
tiff received at its home office in Greenville, South 
Carolina, a paper designated as No. 64, General 
·Change Endorsement, a copy of which is hereunto 
annexed, and by this reference made a part here-
of. 
12. That on the 26th day of June, 1958, Third 
Party Plaintiff "rrote to H. F. Benson, Jr., doing 
business as Surplus Line Company, a letter ac-
knowledging receipt of the aforesaid General 
Change Endorse1nen in the following language: 
Gentlemen: 
We are in recept of endorsement \Yhich 
terminates reinsurance certificate A1\I 0165-93 
for the above risk." 
13. That on or about the 30th day of June, 
1958, the truck described in Third Party Plain-
tiff's Policy No. A-77765 \Yas involved in an 
accident as a result of \vhich it \Yas substantially 
damaged. 
1+. That the insureds, under said Policy X o. 
A-77765 together with the loss payee and their 
successors in interest, connnenced an action 
against Third l>arty Plaintiff in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, to recover da1nages for the 
truck aforesaid. 
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1 :>. That said action ca1ne regularly on for 
trial before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, 
one of the judges of the above-entitled Court on 
the ~5th day of Febn1ary, 1960, 'vhich resulted 
in a judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs therein, 
and against Third Party Plaintiff in the amount 
of $10,000, plus costs of court, and interest." (R. 
101-105). 
The following amendment to the Stipulation 'vas 
n1ade at the trial : 
"l\Ir. Harold Christensen: It is stipulated by 
and between counsel for the parties that with the 
paper designated as No. 64, General Change En-
dowment, referred to in paragraph 11 of the 
Stipulation of Facts, was a credit memorandum in 
form, Exhibit 1, attached to the Stipulation of 
Facts, and that in the accounting between Canal 
Insurance Company and the Surplus Line Com-
pany, no credit for the an1ount shown on Exhibit 
1 was at any time claimed or taken by Canal 
Insurance. 
l\1:r. Ra~r ·Christensen: Canal will so stipu-
late." (R. 89). 
The certificate of reinsurance issued by The Ben-
~on Cornpany for Lloyds insured Canal to the extent of 
73 pPr cPnt of 100 per cent of its liability under its 
Policy No. A-77765. 
Relative to cancellation, the reinsurance certificate 
provided: 
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''·Cancellation: This certificate 1nay be can-
celled by the Assured at any time on the custon1-
ary short rate basis by giving notice in \Vriting 
or surrendering this certificate, to THE BENSOl~ 
CO~fP ANY. This certficate may also be cancel-
led by U~DER\VRITERS, or by THE BENSO~~ 
CO:JIPANY on their behalf, "ith or without 
tender of unearned pre1niun1, by giving ten (10) 
days notice in writing to Assured at his last 
knO"\V11 address, and stating therein the effective 
date of such cancellation. In event of such can-
cellation by lJNDERWITERS, or by TI-IE BEN-
SON COl\fP ANY, on their behalf, UNDER-
vVRITERS shall refund the premium paid, less 
the earned part thereof upon demand, ahvays 
subject to retention by lTKDER'\rRITERS of any 
n1inimum pre1nium stipulated herein; such prem-
ium adjustment to be on a pro rata basis." (R. 
104). 
The General Change EndorseLlent~ effective ~lay 
2·1-. 1958, referred to in paragraph 11 of the foregoing 
stipnlation of Facts as Exhibit 1 provided: 
"It is agreed that as of the effect1Ye date 
hereof, the policy is a1nended in the f.ollo"Ting par-
ticulars. In consideration of a return pre1nit11i1 
of $418.08 and $4.18 reinsurance tax this cer-
tifieate ter1ninated in conjunction "~ith oYerla:.-ing 
Canal policy." ( R. 104). 
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The statement of account referred to in the General 
Change Endorse1nent sho,ved a net credit to Canal of 
$~~Hi.S-!- representing $418.08 less the co1nmission plus 
tllP reinsurance tax. 
The Court concluded fro1n these facts that the (}en-
eral Change Endorsen1ent did not cancel reinsurance 
certificate I\ o. A~I 0165-93 prior to the accident and 
that Canal was entitled to judgment against Lloyds in 
the su1n of $7,500 and eosts. Judgment was entered 
against Lloyds in that amount on ~fay 24, 1960 by 
Judge Anderson. 
Lloyds filed Notice of Appeal fron1 both judgraents 
on J nne 3, 1960. 
STATEl\iENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
T!IE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENIT TO SUPPORT 
TilE FINDINGS IN FAVOR OF DIAMOND T UTA.I-I, Il'-TC.y 
AND AGAINST CANAL. 
POINT II 
CANAL'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED. 
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A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
DIAMOND T UTAH, INC., TO AMEND ITS 
PLEADINGS AFTER JUDGMENT. 
B. THE 'TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING 
CERTAIN EVIDENCE DURING THE TRIAL. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS IN FAVOR OF CANAL AND AGAINST 
LLO·YDS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS IN FAVOR OF DIAMOND T UTAH, INC., 
AND AGAINST CANAL. 
The trial court based its judgn1ent in favor of 
Dian1·ond T upon a finding 1nade at the ti1ne of Canal's 
~[otion for N e\\'" Trial that: 
"14-A. ·That the testilnonv of the \Yitness, 
~Irs. Sandra Redding, that she 1nailed the Notices 
of Cancellation to the na1ned insured and to the 
loss payee na1ned on the Canal Insurance Policy .. 
is true, and that said \vitness did, in fact, 1nail said 
notices, as testified by her. 
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The C·ourt further finds that the Defendant is 
estopped from claiming that the notices 'vere 
mailed, and from clain1ing that the insurance 
policy was cancelled. 
The Plaintiff is granted per1nission to arnend 
the pretrial order and file a reply in order to 
allege estoppel, to conform to the proof admitted 
in this case." (R. 86, 87). 
The theory of estoppel, upon which this judg1nent 
rests is inconsistent with the evidence and theory ad-
vanced by Diamond T at trial. To establish an estoppel, 
Plaintiffs must prove that they had no knowledge of 
the true facts and reasonably relied on Canal's activities 
to their detriment. Migliacco v. Davis, 120 Utah 1, 
23:2 P. 2d 195 (1951). The trial court apparently reasoned 
that the fact that the agent of Canal accepted the pay-
ments after Notice of Cancellation caused Dia1nond T 
and Drain to reasonably believe the cancellation 'vas 
vacated and, in reliance upon such belief, that Diamond 
T and Drain failed to procure other insurance. The error 
here, of course, is that plaintiffs' entire theory and 
evidence rested upon the premise that they had no 
knowledge of the cancellation since they contended the 
X otice of Cancellation was never sent or received, a 
position totally inconsistent 'vith the Court's finding of 
estoppel. Counsel for Plaintiffs stated his position for 
the trial court : 
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"Mr. Wilkinson: We take issue as to the 
mailing of any notice. We claim they 'vere not 
mailed. 
The Court: They were not mailed 
Mr. Wilkinson: Yes, no notices were re-
ceived . . . " ( T. 5) . 
Further, plaintiffs' counsel contended that the ac-
ceptance of the payment by Canal's agent constituted 
proof that no notice was actually mailed (T. 6). On 
direct examination, Sherman N. Drain testified: 
fi,C it.~ 
'' Q. Did you ever receive a notice of cancel-
lation~ 
A. No, sir I did not. 
Q. On any of the policies involved~ 
A. No, sir, I never received any eancella-
tion." ( T. 78, 79). 
* * * 
"Q. You had no notice fro1n anyone con-
cerning cancellation~ 
A. No, sir." (T. 79). 
Mr. Grant G. Bryan, representing plaintiff Zion's First 
National Bank, said: 
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"Q. I show you "\vhat has been marked 
Exhibit 2, and I will ask you if you ever received 
a cancellation notice, \vhich that would be a copy 
of, cancelling the policy \vhich has been marked 
Exhibit 1, which you have~ 
A. No, sir, I do not recall rece1v1ng any-
thing like that. 
Q. Did you receive any kind of a cancellation 
notice on that policy~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you receive any notice by telephone 
or other"\vise, to the effect that the policy had been 
cancelled~ 
A. No, sir." (T. 93). 
The \vitness J an1es reaffirmed the theory that notice 
of cancellation had never been given. He stated: 
"'Q. I sho"\v you what has been marked Ex-
hibit 2 \vhich purports to be a notice of cancel-
lation of insurance policy, and I will ask you if 
you ever received a notice that "\vould be a copy 
of. 
A. l don't recall receiving this type of notice 
of cancellation in connection "Tith this policy. 
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Q. Did you say you did not receive that type 
notice~ 
A. Yes, I can say I did not receive this type 
notice." (T. 102). 
Plaintiffs are bound by the facts adduced at trial. 
It is inconceivable that these facts could give rise to an 
estoppel, which must be based upon the facts found. 
Skeen v. Van Sickle, 80 Utah 419, 15 P.2d 34-± (1932). 
Since plaintiffs claimed and testified that they never 
received notice of cancellation and that they did not 
know such notice had been given, they could not possibly 
have relied on the acceptance of the payment to invalidate 
and set aside that notice. 
The court's finding that Canal is estopped from 
claiming that notice of cancellation \Yas 1nailed and the 
policy thereby cancelled is directly contrary to plaintiffs' 
o"\vn evidence and the la\v and should be reversed. 
The only issue presented by the evidence ''Tas 
\vhether notice "Tas given as provided in the policy and 
on this issue the evidence established and the trial court 
found that notice of cancellation had been givPn in ac-
cordance \vith the ter1ns of the policy (T. 86, 87). In 
vie\\T of this finding, the conelusion is inescapable that 
the (~anal policy \Yas cancelled prior to the loss giving 
rise to the clabu involved in this case. 
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Paragraph 13 of the policy conditions provided: 
'~ . . . this poiicy may be cancelled by the 
Company by mailing to the insured at tlH~ address 
sho,vn in this policy, written notice stating 'vhen 
not less than 10 days thereafer such cancellation 
shall be effective. The mailing of notice as afore-
said shall be sufficient proof of notice. The time 
of the surrender or the effective date and hour 
of cancellation stated in the notice shall become 
the end of the policy period. Delivery of such 
written notice, either by the insured or by the 
'Company shall be equivalent to mailing." (Ex. 1). 
As indicated, the only contention made by plaintiffs 
hefore and during the trial of this case was that notice 
of cancellation 'vas not received by the persons entitled 
to notice and hence such notice was probably not mailed. 
It is 'vell settled that receipt of notice of cancellation 
is immaterial where the policy provides that notice shall 
be effrctive upon mailing. 
"The cancellation notice here complies in all 
respects 'vith the requirements of the policy, so 
that, if properly addressed, its mailing effectively 
cancelled the insurance coverage as of the date 
specified in the notice. This is true whether or 
not the assured actually received the notice and 
despite the fact he had not then received the 
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refund of the unearned premium." Reddrick v. 
State Capitol Insurance Company, (4 Cir., 1959) 
271 F.2d 641. See also State Farm Mutual Auto-
mob~le lnstttrance Company v. Cheney, (10 Cir., 
1959) 272 F .2d 20. 
Although the notice rn this case provided that it 
would be effective five days from mailing, the policy pro-
vided that the insured \vas entitled to ten days after 
mailing. In such a situation, the notice is construed 
as operative in accordance \vith the terms of the policy: 
''If a notice provides that it shall be effective 
at once, instead of at the end of the stipulated 
notice, it is not void, but will be construed as 
though it contained the usual limitation clause." 
8 Appleman, Insurance La"T and Practice 428 
(Termination of Policy Protection, Section 5012). 
"A notice that a policy 'is hereby cancelled' 
'vas construed as being intended to operate aC-
cording to the ter1ns of the policy at the end of 
five days, and \Yas not regarded as being inopera-
tive because given in prac sent£ instead of at the 
end of five days." 6 A pple1nan, Insurance La\Y 
and Practice 723, ( Ter1nination of Poliey Protec-
tion, Section .J-185). 
Since the notice effectiYely cancelled the insurance policy 
prior to plaintiffs' loss, it is clear that the Court erred in 
finding in favor of plaintiffs and sneh finding sl1ould be 
reversed. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
POINT II 
CANAL'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN GRAN·TED. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
DIAM·OND T UTAH, INC., TO AMEND ITS 
PLEADINGS AFTER JUDGl\iEN:T. 
The judgment for Diamond T rendered by the 
Court against Canal was based upon a theory of estoppel. 
Canal and Lloyds had no opportunity to meet this issue 
~ince it was never presented until the Court, on its own 
1notion at the hearing upon the ~lotion for Ne\v Trial, 
granted counsel for Diamond T the privilege of amending 
its pleadings to set up the affirmative defense of estop-
pel. 
The issues to be tried and which Canal prepared to 
meet as established by the pretrial order were whether 
the insurance policy in question was in force at the 
time of the damage to plaintiffs' truck and the amount 
of such damage (R. 41). At trial the amount of damage 
'vas agreed leaving, in the words of eounsel for Diamond 
T, "only issue No. 1 in issue at this time." (T. 3). 
Then counsel stated its theory on this issue to be that 
notice of cancellation was not n1ailed ( T. 5). No estoppel 
theory \vas ever advanced at any time. It is funda1nental 
that 1ninimum due process requires notice and an op-
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portunity to be heard. The ·Court committed prejudicial 
error in refusing the Motion for Ne\v Trial and yet 
granting the amendment so as to found the judgment 
upon an entirely different theory from that upon which 
the case was tried. 
In Taylor v. E. M. Royal Corp., 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 
P.2d 279 (1953), Justice Henroid, speaking for the Utah 
Supreme Court, said: 
"It is true -that our new rules should be 
'liberally construed' to secure a 'just . . . deter-
mination of every action,' but they do not rep-
resent a one-way street down "Thich but one 
litigant may travel. The rules allow locomotion in 
both directions by all interested travelers. They 
allow plaintiffs considerable latitude in pleading 
and proof to the point \vhere some people have 
expressed the opinion that careless legal crafts-
manship has been invited rather than discouraged. 
Be that as it 1nay, a defendant must be extended 
every reasonable opportunity to prepare his case 
and to meet an adversary's clai1ns. Also he must 
be protected against surprise and be assured equal 
opportunity and facility to present and prove 
counter-contentions~-else unilateral justice and 
injustice \vould result sufficient to raise serious 
doubts as to constitutional due process guaran-
tees." 
In the ronrurring op1n1on of Justice Crockett, it was 
~aid that Rule 5--t- requiring the t~ourt to grant relief 
evPn though not de1nanded in the pleadings should not 
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be .applied unless the opposing party had a fair op-
portunity to be apprised of and meet the issues so 
prP~ented. 
In I\7ational Farnlers Union Prop., & Cas. Co. v. 
T1unn pso u, -± Utah 2d 7, 286 P .:2u 249 ( 1955), Justice 
Crockett in a unanimous decision said: 
"N ot\Yithstanding all of our efforts to elim-
inate technicalities and liberalize procedure, we 
n1ust not lose sight of the cardinal principle 
that under our system of justice, if an issue is 
to be tried and a party's rights concluded with 
respect thereto, he must have notice thereof and 
an opportunity to meet it. This is recognized in 
Rule 15 (b) "\vhich recites that such liberal amend-
lnents shall be ano,ved if the issue is tried ~by 
express or implied consent of the party'". 
In !Jilellncr Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 rTtah 2d 2:26, 310 
P.2d 517 ( 1957), Justice Crockett said in questions aris-
Ing co net> rning issues not raised by the pleadings : 
" ... the adverse party should be given the 
benefit of every doubt, and he must not have been 
mislecl or in any "\\,.ay prejudiced by introduction 
of ne"\v issues." 
lT pon each occasion that evidence concerning thP 
payn1ent after notice of cancellation had been mailed. 
jretion ,,·as n1ade ( T. -1-7, -1-R, -H\ 69, 70, 7S, 81, 8~, 102, 
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103, 122). It cannot, therefore, be said that Canal allowed 
the issue of esoppel to be tried by express or implied 
consent. Constitutional due process, fundamental con-
cepts of fairness and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
require that a new trial be granted to enable Canal to 
meet the issue of estoppel. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING 
CERTAIN EVIDENCE DURING THE TRIAL. 
The Court permitted introduction of evidence of 
payment after notice of cancellation had been mailed. 
Such evidence was not material to any issue before the 
Court. It could only be admissible to an issue of rein-
statement or estoppel, neither of \Yhich 'Yas raised. This 
evidence \Vas admitted over appropriate objections of 
counsel (T. 47, 48, 49, 69, 70, 78, 81, 82, 10:2, 103, 1:2:2). 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIEN'T TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS IN FAVOR OF CANAL AND AGAINST 
LLOYDS. 
On April 7, 1958 Lloyds issued to Canal reinsurance 
certificate I\ o. A~f 0165-93 insuring Canal against 75 per 
<'Pnt of anY loss suffered bY Canal under its Poliev X o. 
. . . 
A-777G5. A reinsuraiH)e certificate is a contrart solely 
het \\·Pen t\vo insurauee eo1npanil'S under \Yhich the liabil-
it~· of thP r0insurer runs only to the reinsured company. 
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The original insured has no interest in such policy. 13 
.\pplPinan, Insurance Law and Practice 43+, (Rein~ur­
anec, Section 7681). 
The detennination of the issue of cancellation be-
t\Yeen Canal and Diamond T has no bearing on the 
eaneellation of Lloyds reinsurance certificate. Lloyds 
had no agree1nent 'Yith any other person that it would 
not cancel any policy of reinsurance (R. 102). On June 
19, 1958 eleven days before the damage to the Dirunond 
T tractor, Canal received Lloyd's General Change En-
dorseinent ""'hich unequivocally cancelled the reinsurance 
policy effective May 24, 1958 in the follo,ving language: 
"It is agreed that as of the effective date 
hereof, the policy is amended in the following 
particulars. In consideration of a return prem-
ium of $418.08 and $4.18 reinsurance tax, this 
certificate ter1ninated in conjunction with over-
laying Canal Policy." (Emphasis added.) (R. 
104) . 
. \1 though purpo eting to relate to an earlier date, this 
cancl\llation by the terms of the reinsurance certificate, 
""'as effectivr ten days from issuance. Since it 'yas 
actually received more than ten days prior to the acci-
dent, there can be no recovery for Canal's loss. 
Tt is clear that ·Canal understood that the r0insuranc0 
had tenninated. By letter of June G, 1958 Canal ac-
kno"\\"'ledged rrrcipt of the endorsement and stated: 
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"We are in receipt of endorsement which 
terminates reinsurance certificate AM 0165-93 
for the above risk." (Emphasis added.) (R.l03). 
The general change endorsement terminating the 
reinsurance used the words "in conjunction with over-
laying Canal policy." The only reasonable interpreta-
tion which can be placed upon the term "in conjunc-
tion with" is that the cancellation of the policy between 
Canal and Diamond T was the reason for the cancel-
lation of the Lloyds reinsurance certificate. The inter-
pretation apparently placed by the Court upon this 
term was that it meant conditioned upon the effective 
cancellation ·of the Diamond T policy. Such an interpre-
tation by the Court is directly contrary to the under-
standing of both parties, as evidenced by Canal's 
acknowledgment that the policy had been terminated. 
Even if the Court ""'ere right in this interpretation, 
the judgment against Lloyds is in error since the Canal 
policy 'vas effectively tenninated. Under the decision of 
the court in the claim of Dia1nond T against Canal, 
Canal 'yas estopped fron1 asserting such cancellation. 
This estoppel ""'as based upon conduct of the agent 
of Cnnal and cannot be asserted against Lloyds. Since 
thP Canal poliry had been ter1nina ted, under either inter-
pretation of the language of Lloyd's notice, the rein-
~nrance 'vas cancelled. 
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COXCLUSION 
Under the evidence and findings of the Court, Canal 
is entitled to judgrnent against Dia1nond T as a matter 
of lR\V. 
Ho\vever, if the Court determines the evidence \vas 
sufficient to raise an issue of estoppel, minimum due 
proce~s requires that a new trial be granted to give Canal 
an opportunity to meet this theory. 
In either event, Lloyds as a matter of law is not 
liable to Canal since its reinsurance certificate was 
effectively cancelled prior to the accident. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW 
& CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
701·Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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